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ABSTRACT In this work a new self-synchronized symmetric encryption solution for high speed com-
munication systems necessary to preserve the format of the plaintext is proposed, developed and tested.
This new encryption mechanism is based on the block cipher operation mode called PSCFB (Pipelined
Statistical Cipher Feedback) and the modulo operation. The confidentiality of this mode is analyzed in terms
of its IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack) advantage, concluding that it can be
considered secure in the same way as traditional modes are. The encryption system has been integrated in
the physical layer of a 1000Base-X Gigabit Ethernet Interface, where the 8b/10b symbol flow is encrypted
at line rate. Moreover, an implementation of the proposed system has been carried out in an FPGA (Field
Programmable Gate Array) device. Finally, an encrypted optical link has been tested with real Ethernet
frames, getting maximum throughput and protecting the data traffic from passive eavesdroppers.
INDEX TERMS Gigabit Ethernet, physical coding sublayer, encryption, stream cipher, PSCFB (pipeline
statistic cipher feedback), FPE (format preserving encryption).
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, we have witnessed the rise of broad-
band networks, mainly thanks to the advance of commu-
nication standards in physical media such as optical fiber.
Thanks to them it is possible to provide the high data
bandwidth demanded by the customers and the market [1].
To achieve information confidentiality maintaining the infor-
mation throughput, high speed encryption systems must be
used.
Encryption methods can be implemented at different levels
of a communication system, for example MACsec [2] or
IPsec [3], for layer 2 and layer 3, respectively. Regarding
to physical level (layer 1), different solutions have been
proposed depending on the transmission medium, such as
[4], [5] or [6]. In the particular case of optical networks,
physical layer it is considered critical to guarantee secure
communications [7], [8], [9].
There are several encryption mechanisms for optical net-
works at physical layer. Some of them are focused on pho-
tonics technologies [9], [10], [11], while others are based on
the protocols of the optical system such as in [12], whereOTN
(Optical Transport Network) frame payloads are encrypted at
bit level. Other examples have been shown for 1 Gbps and
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10 Gbps optical Ethernet standards, where several proposals
have been developed for 64b/66b [13] and 8b/10b [14] phys-
ical encodings. For the particular case of Gigabit Ethernet,
the encryption is performed in the PCS (Physical Coding
Sublayer) layer before the 8b/10b encoder. In this way it
is possible to preserve the coding properties such as the
transition density and short run length, that are necessary to
facilitate the operation of the remote CDR (Clock and Data
Recovery) circuits [15] at the physical layer. In addition, to
preserve the coding properties it is necessary to perform a
kind of encryption able to preserve the format of the plaintext,
in this case the 8b/10b symbol flow.
This kind of encryption is usually called FPE (Format
Preserving Encryption), and although many solutions have
been proposed about it [16], the only ones approved by the
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) are
the FF1 and FF3 modes of operation [17].
As far as the authors are concerned, there are no standard-
ized solutions for FPE self-synchronized stream ciphers, but
some proposals have been made. For example in [18], where
the self-synchronized PSCFB operation mode was proposed
to be used with the underlying FPE block cipher in [14].
An important issue regarded with symmetric encryption
stream ciphers is that thesemust synchronize their keystreams
before starting the encryption session. Furthermore, in case
of missing the synchronization in the middle of a session,
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an ad-hoc mechanism or protocol must be implemented to
recover it. With the use of self-synchronized stream ciphers
it is possible to dispense with these extra communication
processes.
Unfortunately, self-synchronized solution in [18] uses
internally the recommended FF3 scheme that is based on
a non-binary Feistel structure, which is formed by several
processing stages where an AES (Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard) block is required in each one of them. This scheme
increases the hardware complexity of the resulting FPE
self-synchronized solution with respect to other non-FPE
ciphers.
On the other hand, the PSCFB mode has an encryption
efficiency that can be inherently less than 100% [19]. If EK
is an underlying block cipher working in PSCFB mode,
the encryption efficiency represents the number of ciphertext
bits that can be produced in PSCFB mode relative to the
number of output bits produced by EK working in a basic
CTR (Counter) mode. As consequence of having an effi-
ciency lower than 100% it is necessary to use input and output
queues in the PSCFB structure, which increases the latency
introduced by the encryption system [19].
In order to reduce the hardware complexity of possible self-
synchronous FPE stream ciphers, in this work a new structure
able to preserve the format of the plaintext is proposed.
It is based on a recommended block cipher working in an
operation mode that is a synergic combination of PSCFB and
CTR-MOD [20] modes. We have called it PSCFB-MOD.
Since this new proposed operationmode uses as underlying
block cipher a recommended binary block cipher instead of
an FPE one, as in [14] and [18], it is possible to reduce
the hardware complexity introduced by the Feistel structure.
In addition, with this new encryption scheme the input and
output queues are not needed, which reduces the latency
introduced by the encryption system.
By using a recommended underlying block cipher, for
instance AES, it is possible to develop a formal security
proof, in the same way as in traditional confidentiality-only
operation modes, such as CTR or CBC (Cipher Block Chain-
ing). The formal security proof consists of the IND-CPA
(Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack) advan-
tage expression of any adversary attacking this scheme.
Although PSCFB mode has been previously implemented
in Ethernet communications, as in [13], it is important to
remark that it has been done for 10 Gigabit Ethernet links
using the 64b/66b encoding, different to 8b/10b, which is
used in this work. Therefore, the application of PSCFB-MOD
in this work entails an architecture different to the used
in [13], that is able to preserve the format of gigabit Ethernet
symbols and needs a different IND-CPA analysis.
The paper is divided in five sections. In Section II an
introduction about Gigabit Ethernet standard, CTR-MOD
mode and self-synchronized encryption is given. Section III
presents the security analysis and the hardware implementa-
tion of the proposed PSCFB-MOD scheme and their compar-
ison with the traditional CTR. Subsequently, Section IV deals
with the set-up and encryption results. Finally, in Section V
conclusions are given.
II. IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
A. OPTICAL GIGABIT ETHERNET ENCRYPTION
Although there are no standardized solutions for FPE stream
ciphers, its usage could be relevant in communications where
a high encryption rate is necessary, as in physical layer
1000Base-X for optical Gigabit Ethernet systems [14].
In [14] encryption is carried out in the PCS sublayer where
the 8b/10b encoding is performed. Since the 8b/10b encoding
is used to provide important properties to the bitstream, it is
necessary to preserve the format of the 8b/10b symbols.
Therefore, the encryption of a gigabit Ethernet symbol must
give as result another valid symbol that must be within the
group of symbols supported by the standard, which means to
perform an FPE encryption.
Encryption and decryption modules are located in the
physical layer datapath as shown in Fig. 1, before the
8b/10b encoder/decoder. In this figure an Ethernet Interface
is shown. It is composed of the MAC (Medium Access
Control) and PHY layers. PHY module includes PCS, PMA
(Physical Medium Attachment) and PMD (Physical Medium
Dependant) sublayers.
Inside the ENCRYPT module, FPE encryption is per-
formed as shown in Fig. 2. If S is the possible number of
different 8b/10b symbols, using the MAP block, each symbol
is mapped to an integer value in the range {0, . . . , S − 1} to
get a plaintext in radix S. The plaintext is added modulo-S to
a keystream, which is also in radix S, to obtain the ciphertext.
FIGURE 1. Scheme of the Ethernet Interface formed by the PHY and MAC
modules. MAC layer builds the Ethernet packets transmitted to the PHY.
ENCRYPT and DECRYPT modules perform the format preserving
encryption/decryption of 8b/10b symbols at the PCS sublayer. TX_SERIAL
and RX_SERIAL are the serializer/deserializer modules that transmit and
receive the bitstream from the optical link.
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FIGURE 2. Location and generic structure of a stream cipher in a physical
layer with 8b/10b line encoding. 8b/10b symbols are formed by eight






Finally This ciphertext is reverse mapped in the DEMAP
module to get the final 8b/10b encrypted flow. The ciphered
8b/10b symbols will be encoded to 10-bit values and sent to
the serializer.
B. CTR-MOD OPERATION MODE
CTR-MOD mode can be considered a kind-of counter mode
where the counter is in binary radixwith a length of lCTR−MOD
bits while the keystream output is a stream of symbols
in radix S, which is generated thanks a function called
FK_MOD. The ciphertext is obtained thanks to the modulo-S
addition between the keystream and the plaintext. This mode
next to the traditional CTR are shown Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b,
respectively.
FK_MOD can be considered a PRF (Pseudo Random
Function) such that FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}lCTR−MOD →
{0, . . . ,S − 1}. It is configured with a random key K taken
from the keyspace K (KεK). FK_MOD is built thanks
to a block cipher EK as shown in Fig. 3a. In this figure
the block cipher is modelled as a PRF such that
E : K×{0, 1}lCTR−MOD→{0, 1}lCTR−MOD , where lCTR−MOD (the
counter length in bits) is also its block size. Its least sig-
nificant L output bits are taken as input of a modulo-S
FIGURE 3. Structure of (a) CTR-MOD mode and (b) CTR traditional mode.
operation, which is the same as performing the modulo-2L
operation at the output of EK . Finally we can represent




Several mechanisms have been proposed for self-
synchronized encryption. On the one hand, there are
some proposals based on ad-hoc self-synchronized stream
ciphers such as those proposed in eSTREAM project:
SSS and Mosquito [21]. However, they were dismissed
due to their vulnerabilities [22], [23]. On the other hand
self-synchronized stream ciphers can be built thanks to
block ciphers working in certain operation modes such as
CFB (Cipher Feedback), OCFB (Optimized Cipher Feed-
back) [24], SCFB (Statistical Cipher Feedback) [25] or
PSCFB (Pipeline Statistical Cipher Feedback) [19]. Among
them, PSCFB can be considered the best in terms of encryp-
tion throughput, as it can reach a value near to 100%.
The PSCFB operation mode is shown in Fig. 4. It is con-
sidered a combination of two NIST recommended operation
modes, CTR and CFB. The underlying block cipher EK has a
block size of l bits and its structure is a pipelined architecture
with P stages. It works initially in CTR mode, while the
ciphertext is scanned to find a special n-bit sequence called
synchronization pattern. As it is possible to assume that the
output values of EK working in CTR mode are random and
independent, the resulting ciphertext can be considered a
random stream after performing the XOR operation between
the keystream and the plaintext.
Due to the randomness of the ciphered values, the sync pat-
tern is detected at a statistical random point in the ciphertext.
When the pattern is detected, the underlying block cipher EK
does not increment its counter. Instead, it captures the next
l ciphertext bits after the sync pattern and uses them as IV
(Initialization Vector) to feed back the counter value at the
block cipher input. This operation is equivalent to that made
by a block cipher working in CFB mode. Moreover, as the
block cipher has a pipeline architecture with P stages, it is
necessary to disable the sync pattern scanning since the IV is
captured until EK (IV ) is available as new keystream block,
P cycles later. This interval is called the blackout period and
FIGURE 4. Structure of PSCFB mode for encryption and decryption. The
block cipher EK (·) has a block size of l bits, and is implemented using P
internal stages. CNT block represents the counter of this mode.
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FIGURE 5. Structure of the synchronization period in (a) PSCFB mode in
binary radix and (b) PSCFB-MOD with radix S.
it is formed by the IV captured after sync pattern and the next
P-1 ciphered b locks of l bits. The complete synchronization
cycle is shown in Fig. 5a.
After the counter CNT of Fig. 4 is momentarily loaded
with the new IV, it continues with its normal operation, which
means a continuous increment (as in CTR mode) until a
new sync pattern is found in the ciphertext. In that case,
the load operation of the IV is produced again and a new
synchronization period starts.
Let us nameW to the random bit-length of the scan period
and LIV to the length of the IV, then, as mentioned in [19], the
average size in bits of a complete sync period u is formed by
the length of the sync pattern, Lsp = n, the blackout period,
Lbp = LIV + l · (P− 1), and the average of the scan period
length, Lscan = EW , until next sync pattern. Therefore, u can
be expressed as:
u = Lsp + Lbp + Lscan
= n+LIV+l ·(P−1)+E {W }=n+l ·P+E {W } (1)
since LIV = l bits.
III. PSCFB-MOD OPERATION MODE
A. PSCFB-MOD DESCRIPTION
To achieve self-synchronization in the encryption/decryption
of a plaintext in radix S, the first approach could be applying
PSCFB operation mode using an FPE block cipher instead
of a traditional one in binary radix, such as AES. Both
PSCFB structures, in binary and non-binary radix, are shown
in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b, respectively.
On the one hand, the block cipher EK in Fig. 6a has
to be substituted by an FPE block cipher FK , such as the
FF3 structure built in [14]. On the other hand, the XOR
operation in Fig. 6a must be replaced by a modulo-S addition
to generate the ciphertext in radix S. These modifications
in Fig. 6a results in the structure of Fig. 6b, and it corresponds
with the PSCFB mode in radix S that was firstly proposed
in [18].
In both solutions, after the sync pattern is detected, the IV
is captured and used to refresh the counter value. This IV has
a length equals to the input block size l and the same radix as
the ciphertext and plaintext.
In this work, to reduce the hardware complexity and
latency of this first approach, PSCFB-MOD mode is pro-
posed. Instead of using a block cipher, with the same
width and radix for its input and output, a PRF FK_MOD
as described in Section II-B has been used, such that
FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}. The resulting
structure is shown in Fig. 6c.
The main difference between this mode and the previous of
Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b is that the width and radix at the input of
the underlying encryption function FK_MOD is different to
its output.While its input has a binary radix and an l-bit length
the output is in radix S and it only has a length of one symbol.
For this reason, if the captured IV in PSCFB-MOD mode has
a length of LIV symbols in radix S, it must be transformed to
an IV with length of l-bits, which means the same size and
radix as the counter and the input of FK_MOD.
Let us name the captured Initialization Vector in radix S
as IVS , then the IV used to refresh the l-bit counter should be
FIGURE 6. Structure of (a) PSCFB mode in binary radix, (b) PSCFB mode in radix S, and (c) PSCFB-MOD mode. EK represents the block cipher in
binary radix and a block size of l bits. FK represents the FPE block cipher in radix S and a block size of l symbols. Symbols in cases (b) and
(c) are in radix S.
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obtained from IVS thanks a function T(·), such that:
IV = T (IV S) (2)
The IV S can be represented by a vector of LIV symbols
in radix S such that IV S =
{
IV S0,IV S1, . . . ,IV SLIV−1
}
.
The transformation function T(·) has consisted on two steps.
Firstly, the numeral string IVS in radix S is converted to
its binary radix representation with the function NUM(·),
secondly the result from this conversion is truncated to its
least significant l bits to get the IV of length l. Therefore T(·)
can be expressed as:
IV = T (IV S) = NUM (IV S)mod 2l (3)
where NUM (IV S) =
(∑i<LIV




Other issue that has to be taken into account is the length
of the sync pattern. In the case of PSCFB in binary radix
in Fig. 6a, this pattern is n-bit length. However, in PSCFB
schemes for Fig. 6b and Fig. 6c, as the radix is S, the sync
pattern will have a length of n symbols. This length will
influence in the desired SRD (Synchronization Recovery
Delay) for the PSCFB encryption scheme [26], as we discuss
in Subsection III-F.
The structure of a synchronization period of PSCFB-MOD
is shown in Fig. 5b. As the output block size of FK_MOD
is one symbol the blackout period will be formed by the LIV
symbols captured after sync pattern and the next P-1 ciphered
symbols. According to this, the average length in symbols of
a complete sync period u is shown in (4) in a similar way as
in (1).
u = Lsp + Lbp + Lscan = n+ LIV + P− 1+ E {W } (4)
whereW is the random length in symbols of the scan period.
B. IND-CPA SECURITY IN CTR AND PSCFB MODES
Usually the security of the confidentiality-only operation
modes for block ciphers is studied in the sense of IND-CPA
(Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack) secu-
rity [27]. A metric called adversary advantage is obtained
thanks to a game between an active adversary A and
an encryption oracle performing the target encryption
scheme Sε. This encryption scheme Sε is configured with
a key and an experiment bit b, which the adversary tries to
guess.
During the game the adversary sends to the oracle a
sequence of p pair of messages (M01,M
1





Both messages in each pair (M0i ,M
1
i ) have the same
length mi. For each query from the adversary, the oracle
responds with the ciphertext Ci corresponding to the mes-
sage Mbi . Finally the adversary will try to guess if the oracle
encrypted (M01, . . . ,M
0
p ) or (M
1
1, . . . ,M
1
p ), which is the same
as guessing the value of b after the p queries.
To measure the success of the adversary in breaking a
symmetric encryption scheme Sε, the adversary advantage is
defined in [28] as in the following equation:





where the ADV IND−CPASε (A) is the IND-CPA advantage of the




is the probability of the adversary A of guessing the correct
value of configuration bit b. The advantage of A can be
understood as the excess of this probability over 1/2. When
the ‘guess’ probability is almost 1/2 and then the adversary
advantage is negligible, the encryption scheme Sε can be
considered secure.
It is demonstrated in [29] that an adversary B attacking the
PRF security of the underlying block cipher EK of Sε can
be built thanks to the adversary A, and their advantages are
related as follows:





where ADV IND−CPASε (A) is the advantage of A attack-
ing Sε when its underlying encryption function is EK ,
ADV IND−CPASE(Func) (A) is the advantage of A over SE when
the underlying encryption function is a random function
Func(l, l) such that Func(l, l) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l , and
ADV PRFEK (B) is the prf-advantage of any adversary B over EK
as defined in [27].
In the formal security proofs of CTR and PSCFB modes,
expression in (6) can be particularized changing SE term by
CTR and PSCB names, respectively:












where ADV IND−CPACTR and ADV
IND−CPA
PSCFB are the IND-CPA
advantages expressions of any adversary A against CTR and
PSCFB encryption modes, respectively, and ADV IND−CPACTR(Func)
and ADV IND−CPAPSCFB(Func) are the advantages over each encryp-
tion scheme when the underlying encryption function is
a random function Func(l, l). In both security proofs the
termsADV IND−CPACTR(Func) (A) andADV
IND−CPA
PSCFB(Func) (A) are obtained
[29], [13]. It allows to reach the final advantage expression of
both operation modes.
In [29] it is proven that:
ADV IND−CPASε(Func) (A) ≤ PSε(col) (9)
where PSε(col) is the probability of a collision among the
counter values used during the adversary game, it means the
probability of a counter value repetition. According to this,
(7) and (8) can be rewritten as:
ADV IND−CPACTR (A) ≤ 2 · ADV
PRF
EK (B)+ PCTR(col) (10)
ADV IND−CPAPSCFB (A) ≤ 2 · ADV
PRF
EK (B)+ PPSCFB(col) (11)
where PCTR(col) and PPSCFB(col) are the counter collision
probability for CTR and PSCFB, respectively.
Since in CTR mode the counter is incremented in each
encryption step and it is never repeated, the probability of
collision is zero: PCTR(col) = 0. However, during the
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IND-CPA game for PSCFBmode it is possible for the counter
to be fed with a new IV value when the sync pattern is
detected randomly at some point of the ciphertext. As this
new counter value is a random one, this and the subsequent
values of the counter during the next synchronization cycle
could produce a collision with the values of the counter in
previous cycles, then PPSCFB(col) 6= 0. According to this,
in [29] and [13] PSE(col) is obtained, giving rise to the
following expressions:
ADV IND−CPACTR (A) ≤ 2 · ADV
PRF
EK (B) (12)









For the specific case of PSCFB the second term PPSCFB(col)
is not zero. This term depends on some parameters that define
the architecture of the PSCFB scheme, such as the block size l
and the number of pipeline stages P of the block cipher EK ,
and also on the quantity of information bits µ encrypted by
the oracle during the adversary game. From (12) and (13)
it is possible to conclude that CTR mode, although it does
not have the self-synchronous property, it is inherently more
secure than PSCFB when using the same underlying block
cipher EK . Although the first term ADV PRFEK in both expres-
sions is the same, the second one in CTR is zero, which
makes IND-CPA advantage be lower in CTR than in PSCFB
mode.
In the same way as in PSCFB, it is possible to obtain an
IND-CPA advantage expression for PSCFB-MOD, in terms
of some parameters of its encryption scheme. The idea in this
work is to stablish the bounds for these parameters, under
which the resulting structure of PSCFB-MOD is better in
terms of IND-CPA advantage than an operation mode taken
as reference. Particularly, themode used as reference has been
CTR, since, in general, it can be considered the best to achieve
confidentiality-only encryption [30].
The expression of the IND-CPA security for PSCFB-MOD
mode is given in Subsection III-C, while its proof is
shown in Appendix A. The comparison analysis between
PSCFB-MOD and CTR is explained in Subsection III-D.
C. IND-CPA SECURITY IN PSCFB-MOD MODE
It is possible to express the IND-CPA security of
PSCFB-MOD mode according to the following
theorem:
Theorem 1: Let FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}
be the underlying function of the encryption scheme SE
that corresponds with PSCFB-MOD symmetric encryption
mode. Let A be an adversary attacking the IND-CPA secu-
rity of SE that asks at most p queries formed each one
for a pair of messages (M0i ,M
1
i ) with a length of mi sym-
bols of radix S. The p message queries will produce a




Then, it is possible to express the IND-CPA advantage of A
over the PSCFB-MOD scheme in terms of the prf-advantage
of any adversary over the block cipher EK that is part of the
FK_MOD function, such that:










where ADV PRFEK (B) is the prf-advantage of any adversary B
over EK , EK corresponds to the block cipher that is part of the
FK_MOD function, P is the total number of pipeline stages in
FK_MOD, LIV is the length of the IVS used in PSCFB-MOD
scheme and I is the difference between L (the input bit
length of modulo-S operation in FK_MOD) and T , with
T = log2S.





where l is the block size of EK .
The proof of Theorem 1 is developed in Appendix A.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS: PSCFB-MOD VS CTR
Although usually block ciphers are analyzed as PRFs, PRPs
(Pseudo Random Permutations) are what best models them.
Thanks to the PRF-PRP switching lemma [31] it is possible
to relate the PRF and PRP advantages of an adversary against
a block cipher as shown in (16).






where ADV PRFEK (A) and ADV
PRP
EK (A) are the prf-advantage
and prp-advantage of adversary A against block cipher EK ,
respectively. The block size is l and the number of encryption
queries performed by the adversary during the prf-advantage
game is q.
According to (16), IND-CPA advantages for CTR and
PSCFB-MOD in (12) and (14) can be rewritten as:


















where EK is the underlying block cipher, lCTR and
lPSCFB−MOD are the block sizes of EK in CTR and PSCFB-
MOD, respectively, and qCTR and qPSCFB−MOD are the num-
ber of encrypted blocks and symbols during the IND-CPA
games of each mode. For each encrypted block, CTR mode
encrypts lCTR information bits, while for each encrypted sym-
bol PSCFB-MOD encrypts T information bits (T = log2S).
Therefore, the total number of encrypted bits in each mode
during the IND-CPA game are µCTR = qCTR · lCTR for CTR
mode and µPSCFB−MOD = qPSCFB−MOD · T in PSCFB-MOD
mode, respectively.
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TABLE 1. IND-CPA advantage comparison of different modes.
According to this, it is possible to express the advantages of
(17) and (18) in terms of the encrypted bits and compare them
with the IND-CPA advantages of other well-known operation
modes, as shown in Table 1.
We want to parametrize the structure of PSCFB-MOD to
get a security at least better than the CTRmodewhen encrypt-
ing the same amount of information. It means to obtain the
constraints needed to meet condition (19).
ADV IND−CPAPSCFB−MOD (A) ≤ ADV
IND−CPA
CTR (A) (19)
We assume that in both modes it is used a secure underlying
block cipher EK that can be considered a good PRP, which
means that the termADV PRPEK is negligible in both expressions,
(17) and (18). According to this, it is only necessary to
compare the second term of both advantage expressions to














Let us name lPSCFB−MOD as l. Since qCTR = µCTR/lCTR,
qPSCFB−MOD = µPSCFB−MOD/T and µCTR =



















where I = L − T .
Assuming what is mentioned in Theorem 1, as soon as
L ≥ 128+ log2 (1+ 2S), condition Pmaxri ≤ 1/2
l
+1/SLIV is
met. Then by substituting Pmaxri expression in (21) and doing
































As µ ≥ 1 bit and P ≥ 1, if (23) is met for µ = 1 it is met
for every µ, and the same happens with P. Then (23) can be













L ≤ 128+ log2 (1+ 2S) (24)
Equation (24) is the final condition necessary to fix the values
of the PSCFB-MOD parameters such as l, L and LIV . Note
that also condition mentioned in Theorem 1must be met, then
it has also been included in (24).
According to this, we can conclude that if the underlying
block ciphers used in CTR and PSCFB-MODmodes are good
PRPs and have a negligible ADV PRPEK term, it is possible to
obtain a PSCFB-MOD configuration to achieve the same
or better IND-CPA security than CTR when encrypting the
same amount of information. The parameters of PSCFB-
MOD scheme l, L, and LIV will depend on the block size
lCTR of the CTR mode taken as reference and the radix S of
the plaintext, as T = log2S. Expression in (24) will be the
constraint necessary to achieve condition (19).
E. PSCFB-MOD HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION FOR
1000BASE-X
As we have mentioned in Section I the PSCFB-MOD encryp-
tion system has been adapted to work in the 1000Base-X
physical layer for Gigabit Ethernet standard. In this standard
only 267 possible symbols are valid in the 8b/10b encoding,
which means that S = 267.
On the other hand, we assume that we want to achieve at
least a better IND-CPA security than a standard and recom-
mended block cipher, such as AES, working in CTR mode
with a standard block size of lCTR = 128 bits. According to












L ≥ 128+ log2 (1+ 2 · 267)→ L≥138 (25)
where T = log2S ∼= 8.06 and I = L − T .
In this work, we have used the same structure forFK_MOD
than in [20], letting parameters l and L as fixed values such
that l = 192 and L = 149. Therefore to accomplish with (25)
it is also necessary that LIV ≥ 17.
If we substitute the keystream generator of Fig. 6c in
the generic structure of Fig. 2, and set the PSCFB-MOD
parameters as l = 192, L = 149 and LIV = 17 then it is
possible to get the final encryption scheme for PCS sublayer
in 1000Base-X standard as shown in Fig.7.
In the same way as in [20], to get a block size l = 192,
we have used as underlying block cipher EK a Rijndael
structure configured with 192 bit block size and 128 bit key
length. For modulo operation functions, the blockMOD_2149
of Fig. 7 is simply to take the 149 least significant bits
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FIGURE 7. Overall structure for PSCFB-MOD mode in a physical layer with
8b/10b encoding. Decryption will be as encryption but using a
modulo-267 subtraction instead of an addition.
of the Rijndael output, while MOD_267 module uses more
resources as 267 is not a power of two. Its implementation
has been based on [32], which presents a high-speed hardware
structure for a generic operation ‘x mod z’.
The PSCFB-MOD structure shown in Fig. 7 has been
synthetized in a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA (Field Programmable
Gate Array) and the hardware resources used by this solu-
tion are shown in Table 2 in terms of LUTs (Look-Up
Tables), registers and block RAMs. In this table PSCFB-
MOD implementation is compared with other FPE imple-
mentations [33], [20], showing that this work entails a good
Encryption_Rate/resource ratio. Although in this work
the mode PSCFB-MOD entails more hardware resources
than CTR-MOD [20], it is at expense of adding the
self-synchronization property.
Regarding the comparison with the other PSCFB solution
in radix S [18], another benefit of this work is that it does not
TABLE 2. Comparison with other solutions.
need input and output queues, which makes it better in terms
of encryption latency. While in [18] latency introduced in the
PCS datapath is 648 ns, in this work it is only 48 ns.
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the original PSCFB
specification [19] input and output queues are needed to store
information temporarily during periods of resynchronization,
where partial block cipher outputs are used to encrypt data
due to the fact that the sync pattern is not aligned with
the end of the block cipher output. It makes PSCFB mode
inherently to have an encryption efficiency that can be less
than 100%, which makes necessary the usage of input and
output encryption queues increasing its overall latency as
in [18].
However, in PSCFB-MOD the sync pattern (formed by
n symbols) is always aligned with the output block size of
FK_MOD as it is only one symbol length. It means that no
queue is needed in this encryption scheme, which makes the
encryption throughput be 100% and reduces substantially the
overall latency.
The test set-up for the complete Gigabit Ethernet interface
and the encryption results are shown in Section IV.
F. SYNCHRONIZATION RECOVERY DELAY DISCUSSION
The SRD (Synchronization Recovery Delay) is the metric
used to examine the resynchronization properties of SCFB
and PSCFB modes [26]. It is defined as the expected num-
ber of bits following a sync loss before synchronization is
reestablished. According to [19], upper and lower bounds for
SRD depend on the block size of the underlying block cipher,
the number of pipelines P and the size of the synchronization
pattern n.
As shown in Fig. 5, a sync cycle is composed of fixed
length data such as the sync pattern and blackout period, and a
variable length data formed by the scan period with a length
of W bits or symbols. In [25] and [19] it is shown that W
follows a probability distribution that can be approximated
by a geometric distribution such as:
P (W ) = (1− p)W · p (26)
where n is the length of the sync pattern in bits and p = 1/2n.
When the radix of the symbols is S instead of 2, as in this
work or in [18], it is possible to reach the same conclusion,
but using p = 1/Sn. According to this, the expressions for
the first and second moment of the distribution of W will be
as in [25] and [19], but using S as radix:
E{W } = Sn − 1
E{W 2} = 2·S2n − 3 · Sn + 1 (27)
As in (1), we can express, in a generic way, the average
sync cycle size in symbols instead of bits. It is the sum of the
sync pattern, blackout period and scan period:
u = n+ LIV + l · (P− 1)+ E{W } (28)
where u is the average sync cycle size in symbols, l is the
output block size of the underlying encryption function in
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symbols, LIV is the size of the IV after the sync pattern and P
is the pipeline stages.
The same reasoning in [19] relative to the bit slips and
misalignments can be made for [18] and this work, but using
symbols in radix S instead of bits. Thank to this, the lower









(n+ LIV + l · (P− 1))E{W } + E{W 2}
)
(29)
If we call m = n + LIV + l · (P− 1), then, as in [19], but
using radix S instead of binary radix, it is possible to express













m · λ (30)
where λ = (1− 1/Sn)−m.
With both equations, (29) and (30), we can get the theoret-
ical upper and lower bounds for SRD in PSCFB modes with
radix S.
As in [25] and [19], with small values of n, better SRD are
obtained. Indeed, with the parameters used in this work for S,
P, L and LIV the values for SRD become huge when n > 1.
Then, for a feasible solution n has been set to the minimum
n = 1.
In the case of PSCFB in radix S [18], S = 267, P = 41,
l = 22, LIV = 22 and n = 1, which makes the maximum
SRD bound be SRDmax = 1618 symbols.
In this work, PSCFB-MOD, the parameters are S = 267,
P = 84, l = 1, LIV = 17, n = 1, then the maximum SRD
bound is SRDmax = 382 symbols.
As the symbol cycle lasts 8 ns in 1000Base-X standard,
the upper bound for SRD will be approximately 12.94µs and
3.56 µs for PSCFB in [18] and PSCFB-MOD in this work,
respectively.
IV. TEST SET-UP AND ENCRYPTION RESULTS
A. ENCRYPTION SET-UP
The KEYSTREAM GENERATOR and CIPHER OPER-
ATION modules in Fig. 7 have been integrated in the
ENCRYPT and DECRYPTmodules of the Ethernet Interface
described in Fig. 1, which has been implemented in a Xilinx
Virtex 7 FPGA. On the one hand, the Ethernet Interface is
connected to an SFP (Small Form-Factor Pluggable) module
capable of transmitting at a rate of 1.25 Gbps. On the other
hand, it is attached to an Ethernet Frame Generator able to
generate and analyze real Ethernet traffic flows composed by
data frames. The test set-up is shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9,
where two FPGA eval boards are faced to test an encrypted
optical link.
B. ENCRYPTION THROUTHPUT AND LATENCY
Several conclusions can be drawn from simulation and hard-
ware debugging. On the one hand, it is possible to conclude
that encryption/decryption is performed correctly and syn-
chronously achieving the 100% of the encryption throughput.
FIGURE 8. Test set-up scheme.
FIGURE 9. Test set-up photo.
In particular, bursts of 1024-byte length frames were tested
with a duration of 107 frames transmitted using the maxi-
mum possible bandwidth of 98%, according to the minimum
standard IFG (Inter Frame Gap). Another advantage is that
the proposed encryption system only introduces a total extra
latency of 48 ns in the PCS datapath, which includes the
overall latency of PSCFB-MOD mode without queues.
These advantages of performing encryption at physical
layer contrasts with encryption techniques at other layers
[34] [35], which introduces overhead on data frames and
reduce the overall data bandwidth. For example, in IPsec
the encryption overhead can reduce the overall throughput
between 20% and 90% of the maximum achievable [36].
In addition, regarding to the previously mentioned latency
we can conclude that this work can perform encryp-
tion with comparable latency figures to those achieved by
other physical layer techniques such as in OTN encryp-
tion [12], where latency is in the range of hundreds of
nanoseconds [37].
C. TRAFFIC PATTERN ENCRYPTION
One of the benefits of this kind of encryption, as mentioned
in [14], is that it is possible to mask data patterns and
hide the presence of transmitted frames, for example by
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TABLE 3. Measured shannon entropy.
making unrecognizable their beginning and end, and also
their complete headers, therefore hiding statistical traffic
features, which could improve the overall security. As in [14],
to prove this capability SE (Shannon Entropy) has been
measured as shown in (31) for different encrypted and
non-encrypted data traffic patterns. The 8b/10b symbol
stream for each traffic pattern, mapped between 0 and S − 1,
has been grouped in tuples of t symbols called βt , and
the probability for each tuple, P(βt ), has been calculated.







P (βt) · log2 P (βt) (31)
SE result is given in bits/symbol. Ideally, if every t-tuple
(βt ) is equally likely with probability P (βt) = p = S−t the




· S t · p · log2 p = log2 S = log2 267 ∼= 8.0606 (32)
Owing to the limited memory in FPGA hardware resources,
measurements for each pattern have been calculated at sim-
ulation stage. The results for SE values has been shown
in Table 3. In this table it is possible to note that encrypted
flows (values in column ‘E’) achieve the maximum entropy
value while non encrypted flows (values in column ‘NE’)
achieve a value different for each traffic pattern and lower
than the maximum in (32). This fact shows that the differ-
ent traffic patterns are indistinguishable when encryption is
active, which proves the masking property of the proposed
scheme.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work the authors have presented a new self-
synchronous symmetric encryption scheme able to cipher
data preserving its format. The security analysis has been
carried out concluding that it is possible to get at least the
same or better security than classical CTR mode structures
using 128-bit block size ciphers. In addition, as the underly-
ing block cipher in the proposed mode can be a recommended
one in binary radix, the hardware complexity is reduced in
regards to the typical FPE modes, such as FF1 or FF3.
The proposed solution has been parametrized to work in an
optical Ethernet Interface with encryption capabilities. It has
been tested with real Ethernet traffic proving its masking
property at physical layer. The implementation results also
give a better Encryption_Rate/Slice ratio than other exist-
ing implementations for FPE solutions. Moreover, the pro-
posed self-synchronous encryption structure does not need
input and output queues, which contrasts with typical PSCFB
schemes, reducing the latency introduced in the encryption
datapath.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
By taking into account that the underlying encryption func-
tion of PSCFB-MOD isFK_MOD instead ofEK , it is possible
to express directly its IND-CPA advantage expression in the
same way as with PSCFB in (11), such that:




where ADV IND−CPAPSCFB−MOD is the advantage of A attacking
the PSCFB-MOD scheme when its underlying function is
the PRF FK_MOD, ADV PRFFK _MOD is the prf-advantage over
FK_MOD and PPSCFB−MOD (col) is the collision probability
of the counter during the IND-CPA game for PSCFB-MOD.
According to the following two lemmas it is possible to
proof Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Let FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}





as defined in Section II-B, where S is not a power of two,
EK is a block cipher with block size l and L is an integer
number smaller than l. Then, according to [20], any adversary
A making q oracle queries when attacking the prf-security of
FK_MODwill obtain an advantage bounded by the following
expression:






where I = L − T , T = log2S and ADV
PRF
EK (B) is the
prf-advantage of any adversary over EK . Note that in the
definition of the prf-advantage ADV PRFFK of any adversary
over a generic PRF FK [27], the adversary sends q blocks
of data to an oracle able to perform that PRF. Then the oracle
answers to the adversary with the q encrypted blocks. In the
case of the advantage over FK_MOD, as it has an input size
of l-bits and an output size of one symbol in radix S, the
q queries performed by the adversary will correspond with
q encrypted symbols instead of q blocks of l-bit width.
Lemma 2: Let FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1} be





where S is not a power of two, EK is a block cipher with block
size l and L is an integer number smaller than l. Then the term
ADV PRFFK _MOD can be considered lower than the prf-advantage
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over a generic block cipher with block size lREF bits as soon
as L ≥ lREF + log2 (1+ 2S).
Lemma 3: Let SE be a PSCFB-MOD scheme with
an underlying encryption function FK_MOD such that
FK_MOD: K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1} , where LIV is the
length of the IVS used in the PSCFB-MOD scheme, P is
the number of pipeline stages for FK_MOD and q is the
number of encrypted symbols during the p message queries
performed in the IND-CPA adversary game against this
encryption mode. Then the probability of collision PSE (col)
of any counter value during the p queries is bounded by the
following expression:
PPSCFB−MOD (col) ≤ Pmaxri · q
2/(P− 1+ LIV ) (35)
where Pmaxri ≤ 1/2
l
+ 1/SLIV as soon as the parametrization
of FK_MODmakes it be a good PRF when comparing it with
a recommended block cipher with a 128 bit block size, as
specified in Lemma 2. It means thatLmustmeet the condition
L ≥ 128+ log2 (1+ 2S).
By substituting the terms ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) and
PPSCFB−MOD (col) of equations (34) and (35) in (33) it is pos-
sible to get as result equation (14) which proves Theorem 1.
Expression of Lemma 1 is already proven in [20]. For clar-
ity purposes proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are included
in Appendices B and C, respectively.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
In the proof of Lemma 2 it is necessary to take into account
that the underlying encryption function in PSCFB must be
a good PRF. In this way it is possible to consider that its
output values are random and independent. As FK_MOD is
the underlying function in PSCFB-MOD then it is necessary
to know under what condition we can consider it as a good
PRF.
According to [27] when a random function works as the
underlying function in a counter scheme, successive values
of the counter makes the output values of the function be
random and independent. When the underlying function is
not a random one, but a PRF, then if the prf-advantage of any
adversary over this function is low enough we can consider
that the PRF is undistinguishable from a random function
and its output values also can be considered random and
independent.
In general, recommended block ciphers can be considered
good enough to generate random values as keystream in
counter schemes such as CTR or PSCFB. The idea of this
proof is to compare the prf-advantages of a recommended
block cipher and the function FK_MOD. Let be EK_REF the
block cipher used as reference with a block size of lREF
bits. Let be FK_MOD a PRF such that FK_MOD(x) =(
EK (x)mod 2L
)
mod S, where EK is a block cipher with
block size l and L is an integer number smaller than l.
Then their prf-advantages should be related as in (36).




According to Lemma 1 [20] prf-advantage of FK_MOD is
bouded by the following expression:






where q is the number of queries performed during the prf-
advantage game and I = L − T .
On the other hand, thanks to PRF-PRP switching lemma
expression (16) it is possible to rewrite prf-advantages of
FK_MOD and EK_REF as:














where qREF are the number of queries performed during the
prf-advantage game of EK_REF .
By taking into account (38) and assuming that we want to
get a better bound for the prf-advantage with FK_MOD than
with EK_REF when performing the same number of queries












We assume that in both cases secure underlying block cipher
EK and EK_REF are used. As block ciphers can be considered
good PRPs it means that the term ADV PRPEK is negligible in
both sides of the condition in (39). According to this, it is
only necessary to compare the second term of both advantage










As q ≥ 1 the left side of (40) is maximum with q = 1. Then


























As d ≥ 0 the right side in (43) will be maximum with d = 0.
In addition T = log2S. Therefore (43) can be rewritten as:
L ≥ lREF + log2 (1+ 2S) (44)
Equation (44) will be the condition to meet (36) and consider
that FK_MOD is a better PRF than a block cipher with block
size lREF , which proves Lemma 2.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The generic expression for the collision probability PSE(col)
of the counter values during the IND-CPA game against
counter based encryption schemes SE is given in [29].
Particularly, traditional CTR and CTR$ modes are analyzed.
In CTR mode the counter values are never repeated while in
CTR$ the counter is reset to a random value at the beginning
of a message query, which means that some repetition can
happen between the counter values used to encrypt different
messages.
As mentioned in Section III-B each message query in the
IND-CPA game is formed by a pair of messages (M0i ,M
1
i )
with a length ofmi blocks of data. The pmessage queries will
produce a total number of q encrypted blocks, which means
that q =
∑i=p
i=1mi. These blocks of data have the same length
and radix as the output of the underlying encryption function.
In the case of PSCFB-MOD these blocks are formed by one
symbol in radix S, as FK_MOD output.
For the case of CTR$, the underlying encryption function
is the block cipher EK , with an input and output that are
l-bit length. The l-bit length counter values along the game
are represented in the following table:
r1 + 1, r1 + 2, . . . , r1 + m1
r2 + 1, r2 + 2, . . . , r2 + m2
. . . . . . . . .
rp + 1, rp + 2, . . . , rp + mp (45)
In (45) each i-th row correspond with the counters used in the
encryption of the pair (M0i ,M
1
i ) with lengthmi. At the begin-
ning of each query a random counter value ri is generated.
As the counter is incremented in each encryption step and the
message has a length of mi data blocks the last value of the
counter in each row will be ri + mi.
In [29] it is demonstrated that the collision probability
between any counter value in the i-th row and the previous





where col i is the event where there is a collision in the first
i rows of the table, and no_col i−1 the event where there is
no collision in the first i-1 rows. Nchoices(ri) are the number
of choices of ri that can produce a collision and 1/2l is
the probability for ri to be equal to any of these choices.
We call this probability Pri (x) = P (ri = x), with x any l-bit
length value in Nchoices(ri). As ri is generated randomly we
can consider it has a uniform random distribution such that
Pri (y) = Pri = 1/2
l for any i and y ∈ [0, 2l − 1]. It means
that Pri (x) is equal to 1/2
l for any x ∈ Nchoices(ri).
Finally, given (46), in [29] it is shown that PSE(col)
for CTR$, the collision probability along the counter table

















For the particular case of PSCFB, in [13] it is shown that the
encryption session can be divided into different sync cycles
as the shown in Fig. 5. In each sync cycle the counter is reset
to a random IV value as mentioned in Section II-C. Let us
assume that N sync cycles happen during the IND-CPA game
between the adversary and the oracle. Then, the counter val-
ues during the session can be represented as in the following
table:
r1, r1 + 1, . . . , r1 + k1 − 1
r2, r2 + 1, . . . , r2 + k2 − 1
. . . . . . . . .
rN , rN + 1, . . . , rN + kN − 1 (48)
where ki is the length in blocks of data of the i-th sync
cycle. The subsequent counters from ri in advance will be
incremented up to ri+ ki−1. According to [13], by using the
same reasoning than in [29], PPSCFB(col) can be expressed as
in (47), in terms of Pri :




In PSCFB mode, as in CTR$, the counter is an l-bit length
value. It is reset to the IV at the beginning of each sync cycle
and it can be considered random and uniformly distributed.
Therefore, in (47) Pri = 1/2
l for any i and x ∈ [0, 2l − 1].
In the case of PSCFB-MODmode, as the encryption game
can be also divided in N sync cycles the same expression
as (49) could be applied to obtain PPSCFB−MOD(col).
However, as explained in Section III-A, the l-bit length IV
is not taken directly from the ciphertext, but its value is
obtained from the LIV -symbol length value IVS , such that
IV = T (IV S). As the ciphertext, in radix S, can be con-
sidered random and uniformly distributed, the same happens
with IV S , as it is taken from the LIV symbols after the sync
pattern detection. Therefore, IVS can be considered a uniform
random value in the range [0, SLIV −1]. Particularly the trans-
formation T (·) as been chosen such that IV = T (IV S) =
NUM (IV S)mod 2l as shown in (3).
IVS and its binary representation, NUM(IVS ), can be
considered random and uniformly distributed as soon as
FK_MOD output is considered also random, which means
that parameter L in FK_MOD must meet condition in
Lemma 2. However, IV is obtained by truncating NUM(IVS )
to its least l significant bits. Therefore, IV cannot be consid-
ered random and uniformly distributed as a bias is introduced
due to modulo-2l operation. Owing to this, ri counter values
at the beginning of each sync cycle will not be uniformly dis-
tributed and special considerationsmust be taken into account
to obtain Pri (x) as it will not be constant and equal to 1/2
l .
Let assume Pmaxri as the maximum probability in the prob-
ability density function Pri (x), then if we particularize (49)
to PSCFB-MOD mode we can get an upper bound for the
following collision probability such that:
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In addition, as the output block size in PSCFB-MOD is one
symbol with radix S, then ki = qi, where qi is the number of
symbols with radix S encrypted in the i-th sync cycle, then:




· (N − 1) · q ≤ Pmaxri · N · q ≤ Pmaxri · Nmax · q (51)
where q is the total number of symbols encrypted during the
IND-CPA game and Nmax the maximum possible number
of sync cycles produced during the game. It is possible to
express this value as Nmax = q/Cmin, where Cmin is the
minimum size of any sync cycle in symbols. As shown
in Fig. 5b the generic sync cycle length in PSCFB-MOD can
be expressed as u = n + LIV + P − 1 +W symbols, where
n, LIV and P are constant, whileW is variable. The minimum
value for this cycle length could be considered with W = 0,
then umin = n+ LIV + P− 1, where P is the pipeline size of
the underlying block cipher and n the sync pattern size. If we
call w = P− 1+ LIV then Nmax = q/umin ≤ q/w, therefore:







which is the same as equation (35) in Lemma 3.
The last step to prove Lemma 3 is to demonstrate that
Pmaxri ≤ 1/2
l
+ 1/SLIV , which is proved in the following
paragraphs.
Let us name NUM (IV S) as vi and IV as ri. Then vi and ri
will be two random variables such that ri = vi mod 2l , where
vi ∈ [0,M − 1], ri ∈ [0, 2l − 1] andM is not a multiple of 2l .
If FK_MOD meets Lemma 2 its captured output vi will be
random and uniformly distributed, then P(vi = x) = 1/M ,
where P(vi = x) is the probability that vi is equal to x and
x ∈ [0,M − 1]. In Fig. 10 the way of mapping values
from the domain {0, . . . ,M − 1} to
{
0, . . . , 2l − 1
}
thanks
to modulo-2l operation is shown. The remainder R of the
division betweenM and 2l can be written as:
R = M − d · 2l (53)
FIGURE 10. Domain
{
0, . . . ,M−1
}
is mapped into interval
{
0, . . . ,2l−1
}
.
After modulo-2l operation, each range Ii is equally distributed in the
destination range
{
0, . . . ,2l−1
}
, however the last range{
d2l , . . . ,d2l+R−1
}
, only has R values and they are mapped only in the
first R values of
{
0, . . . ,2l−1
}
. It makes each value in the destination
range
{
0, . . . ,R−1
}
has one more occurrence than in
{
R, . . . ,2l−1
}
.
where d is the quotient of the division, which means that d =⌊
M/2l
⌋
. After modulo-2l operation, as R is different to zero,
a bias is introduced in the resulting distribution of values of
ri in the range
{
0, . . . , 2l − 1
}
. vi values that are in the range{
d2l, . . . , d2l + R− 1
}
will generate one more occurrence
in the resulting range {0, . . . ,R− 1} after modulo operation.
Therefore, the probability distribution after modulo-2l will
be:




for 0 ≤ x ≤ R− 1
d
M
for R ≤ x ≤ 2l − 1
(54)
The maximum value for the probability of P (ri = x) will
be:






























As we have called vi = NUM (IV S) then vi ∈ [0,M −
1] → vi ∈ [0, SLIV − 1], which means that M= SLIV and




The final expression for PPSCFB−MOD (col) in (52) next to
the condition in (57) proves Lemma 3.
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